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Evidence
by Marc T. Treadwell*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The survey period saw a number of cases raising significant evidentiary issues. For example, lawyers engaged in civil litigation should be
aware of decisions addressing the admissibility of collateral source
payments and offers to pay medical bills in tort actions. Also, the court
of appeals struggled with the question of whether the forfeiture of a
bond posted in response to a traffic citation is admissible in a subsequent civil action as an admission of liability. With regard to criminal

law, decisions rendered during the survey period suggest that at least
some members of the supreme court will be taking a more restrictive
view of the range of admissible similar transaction evidence. Also, both
the supreme court and the court of appeals continue to skeptically view
expert testimony in criminal cases. All litigators may find decisions on
Georgia's relatively new necessity exception to the hearsay rule
interesting.
II.
A.

RELEVANCY

Generally

Basic relevancy analysis is rarely seen in appellate decisions, perhaps
because such a simple issue rarely merits serious attention on appeal.
The court of appeals decision in DeCastro u. State,' however, is an
exception and its discussion of the concept of relevant evidence is
instructive. The opinion does not, however, include a definition of
relevancy; thus, it is appropriate to note that for Georgia courts the

* Partner in the firm of Chambless, Higdon & Carson, Macon, Georgia. Valdosta State
University (B.A., 1978); Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1981). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
1. 221 Ga. App. 83, 470 S.E.2d 748 (1996).
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generally accepted test for relevancy is whether the evidence renders the
desired inference more probable than it would be without the evidence.2
In DeCastro,the trial court admitted a photograph of defendant taken
shortly after his arrest, a photograph which even the prosecution agreed
made defendant appear "'ominous.' " The trial court expressed strong
reservations about the photograph, but admitted it nonetheless. The
court of appeals acknowledged that in Georgia, just as under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact.4 The court,
however, based its conclusion on the more fundamental question of
whether the photograph was relevant to begin with.' The prosecution
argued that the photograph, which was taken at the time of defendant's
arrest, was admissible because "all circumstances surrounding an arrest
are relevant for whatever value the jury may wish to place on them.'
The court acknowledged that the facts and circumstances surrounding
an arrest may be admissible as part of the res gestae.7 The photograph,
however, was taken a week after defendant's arrest and, thus, was not
admissible as a part of the res gestae.8 Moreover, the photograph did
not depict some circumstance relevant to the offense such as a mug shot
of an intoxicated driver suggesting that the driver is still under the
influence of alcohol. Finally, identity was not in issue and, therefore, the
photograph was not admissible for that reason.9 The court summarily
rejected the State's argument that the photograph was admissible
because "the jury was entitled to know how DeCastro appeared to the
victim at the time of the offense," because the photograph was taken
some time after the offense (although the opinion does not say whether
defendant's appearance changed in that one week period), and because
there was no evidence that defendant's appearance frightened or
intimidated the victim, who had lived with defendant for seven years.'0
The court seemed to take offense at the prosecution's central argument
for the admission of the photograph: that defendant, who was wellgroomed at trial, had "'cleaned up his act big time"' and that the jury
should be allowed to consider this fact. 1 The court noted that this

2.
3.

Southern Ry. v. Lawson, 256 Ga. 798, 353 S.E.2d 491 (1987).
221 Ga. App. at 84, 470 S.E.2d at 750.

4.

See FED. R. EVID. 403.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

221 Ga. App. at 84, 470 S.E.2d at 750.
Id. at 85, 470 S.E.2d at 750.
Id. at 85-86, 470 S.E.2d at 751.
Id. at 86-87, 470 S.E.2d at 751-52.
Id. at 86, 88, 470 S.E.2d at 751-52.
Id.at 87, 470 S.E.2d at 752.
Id. at 85, 470 S.E.2d 750.
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argument came "perilously close" to injecting defendant's character into
evidence. 12 While the court acknowledged that a defendant's appearance may be relevant based upon the facts of a particular case, the fact
that defendant appeared at trial in a suit, clean-shaven, and with a
case.1"
short hair cut was not relevant to any issue in defendant's
14
conviction.
defendant's
Accordingly, the court reversed
In Shelter Mutual Insurance Co. u. Bryant, 5 the court of appeals
addressed the issue of whether, in a civil case arising from an automobile collision, the uninsured defendant's intoxication was relevant when
plaintiffs' uninsured motorist carrier admitted liability and when
plaintiffs did not seek punitive damages. The court concluded that this
evidence was admissible because it was "inextricably linked" to the
collision and to defendant's negligence."0 The uninsured motorist
carrier argued, however, that because it had admitted liability,
negligence was not in issue and evidence of negligence was, therefore,
not admissible. The court of appeals disagreed. 7 Although this
removed the issue of negligence, the jury still had to decide issues of
proximate cause and damages. The court concluded that defendant's
intoxication was relevant to these issues as well, apparently because it
related to the fact that defendant was driving far in excess of the speed
limit, lost control of his vehicle, crossed the center line, and ricocheted
off a tree."8 The court also found support for its conclusion in Official
Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 40-6-392(a) which
provides that in any civil action arising from a driver's intoxication,
"evidence of the amount of alcohol or drug in a person's blood ... shall
be admissible." 9
Chief Judge Beasley, in a concurring opinion, appeared troubled by the
court's analysis. She began by noting that "there was not a clear
distinction made between an admission of negligence and an admission
of liability."2 If a defendant admits negligence, he has acknowledged
only the breach of a legal duty. If he admits liability, he acknowledges
that he has breached a duty and that this breach proximately caused
plaintiff's damages. Chief Judge Beasley's examination of the record,
however, seemed to establish that defendant admitted liability and,

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 87, 470 S.E.2d at 752.
Id.
Id. at 88, 470 S.E.2d at 753.
220 Ga. App. 526, 469 S.E.2d 792 (1996).
Id. at 528, 469 S.E.2d at 794.
Id. at 529, 469 S.E.2d at 795.
Id. at 528, 469 S.E.2d at 795.
Id. at 529,469 S.E.2d at 795 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 40-6-392(a) (1994 & Supp. 1996)).
Id. at 529-30, 469 S.E.2d at 795.
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therefore, the only issue submitted to the jury was one of damages. She
concluded that evidence of defendant's intoxication was not a "necessary
ingredient" of the jury's resolution of the issue of damages and that the
better course of action might have been to reject the evidence.2 '
However, Chief Judge Beasley concluded that its admission was not an
abuse of discretion.2 2 Further, Chief Judge Beasley did not seem to
agree with the majority's reliance on O.C.G.A. section 40-6-392(a) and
noted that although the statute authorizes the admission of alcohol tests
as evidence in civil actions, the evidence must first be relevant to a
material issue.'
B.

Relevancy of Extrinsic Act Evidence

1. Similar Transaction Evidence. The determination of the
relevancy of extrinsic act evidence is perhaps the most problematic of all
evidentiary issues. In the nine years this author has surveyed Georgia
appellate decisions, this issue has been the single most frequently
addressed evidentiary issue. Accordingly, some background discussion
is appropriate.
Evidence is extrinsic when it concerns conduct on occasions other than
the one at issue. As a general rule, extrinsic act evidence is inadmissible. Like the rule against hearsay, however, the rule against extrinsic
act evidence is known more for its exceptions than its flat prohibition.
Extrinsic act evidence may be admissible for a substantive purpose, as
when a prosecutor tenders evidence of a similar transaction, usually a
prior criminal offense, to prove a defendant's motive to commit the
charged offense. Extrinsic act evidence also may be admissible to
impeach or bolster a witness, as when opposing counsel uses evidence of
a felony conviction to impeach a witness's character.
Finally, evidence which may appear to be extrinsic may not, in the
sometimes arcane world of evidence, actually be extrinsic. For example,
the res gestae doctrine, although typically thought of as an exception to
the rule against hearsay, is often used to admit evidence that, although
not directly related to the transaction at issue, is close enough.
For years, Georgia courts have routinely and liberally admitted
evidence of similar, but totally unrelated, transactions in criminal cases.
However, as discussed in previous surveys, the Georgia Supreme Court

21. Id. at 530, 469 S.E.2d at 796.
22. Id. at 531, 469 S.E.2d at 796.
23. Id.
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in Stephens v. State24 and Williams v. State25 tightened the rules
26
governing the admissibility of extrinsic act evidence in criminal cases.
In Stephens, the supreme court held that the prosecution cannot rely
solely on a certified copy of a prior conviction when seeking to use that
conviction as similar transaction evidence.27 Rather, the prosecution
must offer evidence proving the requisite degree of similarity or
connection between the extrinsic act and the charged offense. 28 In
Williams, the supreme court, in a dramatic departure from prior
practice, held that the prosecution must prove, prior to trial, three
elements before similar transaction evidence can be admitted. 29 First,
the prosecution must prove the relevance of the independent transaction
to a legitimate issue. 0 Second, the prosecution must prove that the
defendant committed the independent offense or act.3 Third, the
prosecution must prove a sufficient connection or similarity between the
prior act or offense and the charged offense. 2 The trial court must
then make a specific determination that the prosecution has carried its
burden of proving each of the three elements.3 s
Notwithstanding Williams and Stephens, courts routinely and liberally
continue to admit extrinsic act evidence in criminal cases. However, a
change may be in the offing. In Farley v. State,34 the trial court
admitted evidence of defendant's prior conviction of aggravated battery
in his trial for simple battery and felony murder. The majority affirmed
defendant's conviction, finding that defendant's prior conviction was
sufficiently similar to the charged offense to make it relevant to rebut
his claim of justification. 5 The majority reasoned that the prior offense
demonstrated defendant's bent of mind or course of conduct in precipitating violent encounters as opposed to acting in self-defense. 6 The
majority also rejected defendant's contention that his conviction should
be reversed because the trial court failed to expressly find that the

24. 261 Ga. 467, 405 S.E.2d 483 (1991).
25. 261 Ga. 640, 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991).
26. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 45 MERCER L. REv. 229, 231 (1993).

27. 261 Ga. at 468, 405 S.E.2d at 485.
28. Id. at 469, 405 S.E.2d at 486.
29.

261 Ga. at 642, 409 S.E.2d at 651.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 643, 409 S.E.2d at 652.
265 Ga. 622, 458 S.E.2d 643 (1995).
Id. at 626, 458 S.E.2d at 647.
Id.
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probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial impact.3 7
The court of appeals concluded that the trial court's determination that
the evidence was relevant "necessarily constitutes an implicit finding
that the probative value of that evidence outweigh[ed] its prejudicial
impact."3 The court refused to follow the apparent mandate of Adams
v. State"' requiring such an express determination because only four of
nine judges concurred; therefore, the holding was only a "physical
precedent."40
In separate concurring opinions in Farley,Justices Fletcher and Sears
argued that the admission of the extrinsic act evidence was error, albeit
harmless error." Justice Fletcher wrote that the majority "has taken
whatever little viability remained in the rule that a defendant's prior
bad acts are generally inadmissible." 2 Justice Fletcher further argued
that mere similarity is rarely sufficient to justify the admission of
similar transaction evidence.4" Rather, there must be a logical connection between the prior act and the charged offense.44 Intent is an
element in virtually every offense and allowing prior crimes to show
intent solely because of similarity would, Justice Fletcher thought,
eviscerate the general rule against the admission of extrinsic act
evidence.4 5 The court, Justice Fletcher concluded, had allowed "the
exceptions to swallow the rule."4"
Justice Fletcher also attacked the majority's assertion that a finding
of relevance necessarily implied a balancing of probative value and
prejudicial impact.4 7 Prejudice is not a consideration in the determination of relevancy, but rather, becomes a factor only after the court finds
the evidence relevant.4
Justice Sears attacked the majority's "slavish adherence to precedent,
the direction of which badly needs re-examining by this court."49 She,
too, accused the majority of allowing the exception to swallow the rule.

37. Id. at 625, 458 S.E.2d at 646.
38. Id.
39. 208 Ga. App. 29, 430 S.E.2d 35 (1993).
40. Farley, 265 Ga. at 625-26, 458 S.E.2d at 647.
41. Id. at 627-31, 458 S.E.2d at 647-51.
42. Id. at 627, 458 S.E.2d at 647.
43. Id., 458 S.E.2d at 648.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. This is consistent with the Federal Rules of Evidence approach which, after
defining relevancy in Federal Rule of Evidence 401, provides, in Rule 403, that relevant
evidence may be excluded if its prejudicial impact outweighs its probative value.
49. 265 Ga. at 628, 458 S.E.2d at 648.
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"[11t is critical to the sanctity of jurisprudence in this state that this
Court narrow its application of the exception to the rule prohibiting
independent crime evidence, remembering that the exception is contrary
to the fundamental and important prohibition against character
evidence."50 To illustrate her point, Justice Sears examined the prior
offense admitted in Farley. She acknowledged that the similarities
between the two crimes-defendant kicked or hit his opponents in the
head as they lay on the ground-implicated defendant's character, but
that was Justice Sears' point. The evidence tended to show mere
propensity to act in a certain manner. She saw no circumstance in the
prior act that was so unique that it tended to prove that defendant
Rather, it simply showed his bad
committed the second crime.
character."'
Justice Fletcher authored a similar, but milder, special concurrence in
Simmons v.State5" in which he again advocated "a narrower analysis
[that] would provide more guidance in the consideration of this confused
area of evidentiary law."53 Whether a majority of the supreme court
will accept Justices Fletcher's and Sears' pleas for a more circumspect
analysis of extrinsic act evidence remains to be seen.
Although the court of appeals decision in Ricks v.State4 early in the
survey period could not have been motivated by Justices Fletcher's and
Sears' concurring opinions, it perhaps reflects the willingness of at least
some judges of the court of appeals to view extrinsic act evidence more
restrictively. In Ricks, the trial court admitted evidence of defendant's
prior convictions for purse-snatching in his trial for armed robbery. In
the charged offense, defendant allegedly gained access to the home of a
friend's mother and then brandished a knife to force the victim to give
him money and jewelry. Defendant then locked the victim and her
grandson in a bathroom.55 The court of appeals found no similarities
between the prior offenses and the charged offense that would justify the
admission of evidence of the prior offenses.5" These prior offenses were
sudden, unarmed robberies in public places against unknown victims.
The charged offense, on the other hand, involved a lengthy, armed

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 629, 458 S.E.2d at 649.
Id. at 629-30, 458 S.E.2d at 649-50.
266 Ga. 223, 466 S.E.2d 205 (1996).
Id. at 230, 266 S.E.2d at 212.
217 Ga. App. 666, 458 S.E.2d 862 (1995).
Id. at 666, 458 S.E.2d at 863.
Id. at 667, 458 S.E.2d at 864.
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assault in a home against a victim known to defendant. Accordingly, the
court of appeals reversed defendant's conviction. 7
The admissibility of extrinsic act evidence is also frequently an issue
in civil cases. Perhaps incongruously, courts are much more willing to
admit extrinsic act evidence in criminal cases than in civil cases. Some,
no doubt, would argue that courts should be more reluctant to admit
highly prejudicial extrinsic evidence in criminal cases when life and
freedom are at stake than in civil cases. There is, however, some logic
to this disparate treatment. Civil cases rarely involve issues of intent,
motive, scheme, or other issues that come into play in cases involving
intentional misconduct. Rather, civil cases typically involve situations
in which the degree of intent is much less, certainly much less malevolent, and is often completely absent, as in a typical negligence case. For
example, evidence of a prior automobile accident in a negligence case
involving an unrelated subsequent accident would serve only to prove
the improper and prejudicial point that a defendant, because of
negligence on a prior occasion, was more likely negligent on the occasion
at issue. In a criminal case, on the other hand, evidence of a prior
burglary involving facts similar to the charged offense, may tend to
prove defendant's motive, intent, or plan in committing the charged
offense. If so, the prosecutor is not using the prior transaction to show
a defendant's proclivity toward criminal conduct (criminal defense
lawyers, no doubt, scoff at this notion), but, rather, is presenting the
evidence as relevant to the legitimate issue of motive, intent, or plan.
Generally, however, the rule governing the admissibility of extrinsic act
evidence is the same for both criminal and civil cases. Evidence of
similar or related transactions is not admissible to prove that a person
acted in conformity with some prior conduct, but may be admissible to
prove identity, motive, plans, scheme, bent of mind, notice, or course of
conduct, all of which, again, are generally not relevant issues in a civil
case.
In recent years, the admissibility of extrinsic act evidence has become
a hot topic because of claims brought by assault victims against the
proprietors of the establishment where the assault occurred. During last
year's survey period, the court of appeals, in Matt v. Days Inns of
America, Inc.,58 reversed summary judgment entered in favor of
defendant in an action to recover for injuries suffered when a man was
shot while a guest at defendant's motel.5 9 Plaintiffs alleged that
defendant was negligent because it failed to provide adequate security.

57. Id. at 666-67, 458 S.E.2d at 863-64.
58. 212 Ga. App. 792, 443 S.E.2d 290 (1994).
59. Id. at 796, 443 S.E.2d at 294.

1996]

EVIDENCE

Plaintiffs argued that the criminal attack was foreseeable by virtue of
prior criminal activity at the motel. The plaintiffs adduced considerable
evidence of prior criminal activity on the motel's premises and in the
areas immediately surrounding the motel. However, the trial court
ruled that these criminal acts were not sufficiently similar to the attack
at issue to provide notice to defendant that such an attack was
possible.60
A majority of the court of appeals held that the trial court viewed this
similar transaction evidence much too restrictively.6 1 It is not necessary, the majority reasoned, that the prior criminal acts be identical or
virtually identical. The issue is not whether the defendant had reason
to believe that a gun would be used in an attack, which would make only
prior offenses involving guns admissible, but, is "whether the prior
crimes should have put an ordinarily prudent person on notice that the
hotel's guests were facing increased risks."62 The majority criticized the
two dissenting judges' restrictive tests for admissibility, calling them a
"'free bite' analysis" that would absolve a landowner of any responsibility
for an attack by a human because the perpetrators in the prior criminal
offenses wielded knives.6 8 The court of appeals formulated a straightforward test for determining the admissibility of evidence of prior
criminal activity: "[Tihe test is whether the prior criminal activity was
sufficiently substantially similar to demonstrate the landowner's
knowledge that conditions on his property subjected his invitees to
unreasonable risk of criminal attack so that the landowner had
reasonable grounds to apprehend that the present criminal act was
foreseeable."
During the present survey period, the supreme court granted certiorari
and affirmed the court of appeals. With little discussion, the supreme
court held that the court of appeals "applied the appropriate standard
in reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Days
Inns."66
The court of appeals returned to this issue twice during the survey
period. In Piggly Wiggly Southern, Inc. v. Snowden," defendant
contended that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of prior
criminal acts on its premises in a civil action brought by a plaintiff who

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 792-93, 443 S.E.2d at 291-92.
Id. at 794-95, 443 S.E.2d at 293.
Id. at 794, 443 S.E.2d at 293.
Id. at 795, 443 S.E.2d at 293.
Id.

65. Days Inns of America, Inc. v. Matt, 265 Ga. 235, 454 S.E.2d 507, 508 (1995).
66. 219 Ga. App. 148, 464 S.E.2d 220 (1995).
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was stabbed, beaten, robbed, abducted, and sexually assaulted in
defendant's unlit parking lot. 7 The court noted that prior similar
crimes are admissible to prove that a proprietor should have foreseen the
danger of a criminal assault. 8 It is not necessary that the prior crimes
be identical to the assault in question; rather, they need only be
sufficiently similar to put the proprietor on notice that a criminal act
was foreseeable.69 Thus, the court of appeals concluded that similarity
of details is not essential.7" Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether
the acts are similar in their nature, not in their details. 7 Thus, a prior
incident involving a personal attack may be sufficiently similar, but a
prior incident involving an offense against property or public morals
would not be sufficiently similar. In Snowden, defendant's assistant
manager testified about prior purse-snatchings and about harassment
of customers by loiterers." Although these prior incidents were not as
serious as the assault on plaintiff, they nevertheless "involved confrontational attacks on persons, and thus, were sufficiently similar to put
defeiidant on notice of the unreasonable danger of criminal attack; the
differences were merely of degree."73
The court of appeals seemed to take a less expansive view of the scope
of admissible evidence in such cases as Sailors v. Esmail International,

Inc."' In Sailors, the trial court refused to admit evidence of incidents
occurring in defendant's lounge or hotel and only admitted evidence of
crimes involving fights or personal injury that occurred in the parking
lot. 6 A majority of the court of appeals held that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in excluding such evidence.76 Judge McMurray
dissented and noted that the excluded evidence involved seventy-five
separate criminal incidents, over eighteen of which involved violence or
the threat of violence., Judge McMurray argued that the location of
the prior acts was not determinative.76 Rather, the issue was whether
the acts were sufficiently similar to place defendant on notice that its
invitees were subject to assault.79 Moreover, Judge McMurray argued
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 148, 150, 464 S.E.2d at 222-23.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
217 Ga. App. 811, 459 S.E.2d 465 (1995).
Id. at 812, 459 S.E.2d at 467.
Id. at 814, 459 S.E.2d at 469.
Id. at 815-16, 459 S.E.2d at 470 (McMurray, J., dissenting).
Id. at 815, 459 S.E.2d at 469.
Id., 459 S.E.2d at 469-70.

Id. at 148-49, 464 S.E.2d at 222-23.
Id. at 148, 464 S.E.2d at 222.
Id. at 149, 464 S.E.2d at 223.
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that the prior criminal offenses were admissible to -prove that defendant's security was inadequate. 80
2. Evidence of Character as Substantive Evidence. Previous
surveys have chronicled the demise of Georgia's historical prohibition
against the admission of evidence of specific acts of violence by a victim
against a third person to prove the victim's bad character. Arguably, the
supreme court answered the one remaining question in the evolution
during this survey period. Before addressing this issue, some background discussion is appropriate. In Lolley v. State,"1 the supreme
court reaffirmed the long-standing prohibition against the admission of
evidence of a victim's acts of violence against third parties.8 2 In a
concurring opinion, Justice Weltner, joined by Justices Bell and Hunt,
argued that cases excluding such evidence should be re-examined.'3
Justice Weltner argued that in certain situations, such evidence is
relevant.8 4 For example, a defendant attempting to justify his assault
should be permitted to prove his knowledge of the victim's past violent
acts to support his defense that he reasonably believed his assault was
justified. However, Justice Weltner also argued that such evidence
should be admissible even if the defendant had no knowledge of the
victim's violent acts. 85 Justice Weltner's opinion was not based upon
a similar or related transaction analysis, but rather was based expressly
upon a character evidence analysis: "'It is more probable that a person
will act in accordance with his character (disposition) than that he will
act contrary to it."'8 6 In his dissent, Justice Gregory, joined by Chief
Justice Clarke, argued that the evidence should have been admitted as
similar transaction evidence rather than as character evidence.8" In
subsequent decisions, the supreme court appeared to be moving toward
Justice Weltner's decision. In Chandler v. State," a majority of the
Court found Justice Weltner's concurring opinion in Lolley persuasive
and held that "evidence of specific acts of violence by a victim against

80. Id. at 816, 459 S.E.2d at 470.
81. 259 Ga. 605, 385 S.E.2d 285 (1989).
82. Id. at 606, 385 S.E.2d at 286.
83. Id. at 608, 385 S.E.2d at 287-88.
84. Id., 385 S.E.2d at 288.
85. Id. at 609, 385 S.E.2d at 288.
86. Id. at 609-10, 385 S.E.2d at 288 (quoting Henderson v. State, 234 Ga. 827,830 n.1,
218 S.E.2d 612, 615 n.1 (1975)).
87. Id. at 611, 385 S.E.2d at 289.
88. 261 Ga. 402, 405 S.E.2d 669 (1991).
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third persons shall be admissible where the defendant claims justification."8 9
However, Justice Benham, joined by presiding Justice Smith,
concurred specially to note their disagreement with Justice Weltner's
concurrence in Lolley. Justice Benham carefully distinguished the
majority's holding in Chandlerfrom Justice Gregory's dissent in Lolley,
which only addressed the issue of whether the proffered evidence was
He claimed Justice
admissible as similar transaction evidence."
Weltner's concurring opinion in Lolley, on the other hand, allows a party
to place a victim's character in issue, and "is a move to replace trial by
evidence with trial by character assassination."9 1 Justice Benham
concluded that "this revolutionary change in the law of evidence is a
throwback to frontier days and gives judicial sanction to a new defense
to murder: the victim 'needed killing."'92
Justice Benham's concurring opinion in Chandlerperhaps raised some
question whether evidence of a victim's prior bad acts is admissible as
character evidence or rather is admissible as similar transaction
evidence. If the latter, then the evidence would be admissible only if a
defendant knew of the prior incident. It is this question that the court
of appeals answered to its satisfaction during the current survey period.
In Ochle v. State,9" the court reversed defendant's conviction because
the trial court failed to admit evidence of a prior near-altercation
involving the victim.94 The court expressly acknowledged that such
evidence is admissible to prove a victim's "'character for violence,' his
nature,' or his tendency to 'act in accordance with his charac'violent
95
ter."
C. Relevancy of PriorSexual Behavior
In Benton v. State," the supreme court reaffirmed that evidence of
prior false accusations of misconduct must be admitted if the trial court
determines that a reasonable probability of falsity exists.97 In Benton,
the victim of the alleged sexual assault, at a hearing in a prosecution
arising from a prior alleged sexual assault, recanted her allegations,
admitting that she made the false accusations under pressure by her
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 407, 405 S.E.2d at 673.
Id. at 409, 405 S.E.2d at 674.
Id. (Benham, J., concurring).
Id.
218 Ga. App. 69, 459 S.E.2d 560 (1995).
Id. at 73, 459 S.E.2d at 563-64.
Id. (quoting Lolley, 259 Ga. at 608-09, 385 S.E.2d at 288).
265 Ga. 648, 461 S.E.2d 202 (1995).
Id. at 649, 461 S.E.2d at 204.
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mother.9" The court found that the offer of proof was sufficient to meet
the standard of Smith v. State" and, therefore, the court reversed
defendant's conviction. 1
D. Relevancy of CollateralSource Payments
Since the Georgia General Assembly's unsuccessful attempt to make
evidence of payment of an expense from a collateral source (e.g.,
insurance benefits) relevant, the issue of collateral source payments has
proved a vexing one for the courts. Discussion of this ordeal in previous
surveys" 1 has illustrated the tortuous path taken by the courts, often
with conflicting results. During the current survey period, the supreme
court granted certiorari in two cases and addressed both cases in a
single opinion. This perhaps brought some certainty, although certainly
not satisfaction, to the issue. In Warren u. Ballard, 2 the supreme
court addressed the two court of appeals decisions on the issue of when
a plaintiff opens the door to the admission of collateral source evidence.
In Ballard v. Warren,103 the trial court ruled that the defense could not
cross-examine a plaintiff about collateral source payments after plaintiff
testified on direct examination that she was responsible for her medical
expenses and was continuing to make payments for this treatment. The
court of appeals held that the trial court erroneously prevented the
defense from establishing on cross-examination that the plaintiff had
received collateral source payments, reasoning that the plaintiff's
testimony gave the false impression that she had suffered financial
hardship °4
0 a plaintiff testified that when he was told that
In Luke v.Suber,"'
his child would be in the hospital for a month, he responded that he
could not afford the charges that would result. Plaintiff also testified
that he received a bill for these charges even though doctors had told
him not to worry about the expenses. The trial court concluded that this

98. Id. at 650, 461 S.E.2d at 204.
99. 259 Ga. 135, 377 S.E.2d 158 (1989).
100. 265 Ga. at 650, 461 S.E.2d at 205.
101. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 40 MERCER L. REv. 225,238-39 (1988); Evidence, 42
MERCER L. REv. 175, 236-37 (1990); Evidence, 43 MERCER L. REV. 257, 264 (1991);
Evidence, 45 MERCER L. REV. 229, 236 (1993); Evidence, 46 MERCER L. REv. 233, 242-43
(1994); and Evidence, 47 MERCER L. REV. 127, 136 (1995).

102. 266 Ga. 408, 467 S.E.2d 891 (1996).
103. 217 Ga. App. 23, 456 S.E.2d 589 (1995).
104. Id. at 25, 456 S.E.2d at 591.
105. 217 Ga. App. 84, 456 S.E.2d 598 (1995).
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testimony could be impeached by proof of insurance coverage.'O° The
court of appeals reversed.' 7
In Warren v. Ballard,'8 the supreme court, in flawlessly logical
reasoning, noted first that a party may only be impeached on a material
issue.'0 9 Accordingly, a party giving false testimony on an immaterial
issue is not subject to impeachment on that issue. Thus, to the supreme
court, the question was whether testimony regarding anxiety over
payment of medical bills relates to a material issue. The court concluded
that it did not because no recovery may be had for anxiety or worry over
the payment of medical bills."0 Consequently, testimony on this
subject does not relate to a material issue and, therefore, such testimony
is not subject to impeachment.
Turning to the cases at hand, the court noted that in both Warren and
Suber, the plaintiffs' testimony suggesting a lack of insurance coverage
did not relate to a material issue."' Consequently, the defendants
should have objected to this testimony and, upon proper objection, the
trial court should have excluded the testimony and, if appropriate, given
curative instructions."'
Because neither defendant objected, they
waived their objections to this irrelevant testimony" 3 Thus, the
supreme court reversed the court of appeals in Warren and affirmed the
court in Luke." 4 Justice Sears dissented and, in an opinion joined by
presiding Justice Fletcher, argued that evidence of financial hardship is
relevant to the issue of a plaintiff's mental pain and suffering if the
financial
hardship is an immediate consequence of the plaintiff's
115
injury.

The supreme court's conclusion can hardly be satisfying to the defense
bar. They would argue that although testimony suggesting the absence
of insurance coverage and the anxiety resulting from medical bills may
be legally irrelevant, it is practically of great significance. If a plaintiff's
testimony suggests that plaintiff has no insurance coverage and is
personally responsible for medical expenses, then a defendant's only
relief is to object, rather than to impeach. Plaintiffs, thus, will have an
effective tool to enhance the value of their cases. However, in the

106.

Id. at 85-86, 456 S.E.2d at 599-600.

107. Id. at 88, 456 S.E.2d at 601.
108.
109.

266 Ga. 408, 467 S.E.2d 891 (1996).
Id. at 410, 467 S.E.2d at 893.

110. Id.
111. Id.
112.

Id., 467 S.E.2d at 894.

113. Id.
114.
115.

Id.
Id. at 411, 467 S.E.2d, at 894.
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opinion of the author, the supreme court's resolution of this issue is
correct as both a legal and a practical matter. If testimony suggesting
an absence of insurance coverage opens the door to evidence of insurance, how much will the door be opened and when will it be closed? If
a plaintiff had available only five thousand dollars in medical payments
coverage and was otherwise uninsured, would plaintiff be able to prove
the specifics of any insurance coverage? The supreme court's resolution
nips this problem in the bud. Moreover, no doubt trial judges, upon
proper objection, will find a way to communicate effectively to jurors that
a plaintiff or plaintiff's lawyer has improperly injected an issue in the
case.
In addition, the issue is not necessarily a one-way street. For
example, if insured defendants were to testify that they could not afford
to pay any judgment entered against them, the court's opinion clearly
would preclude a plaintiff from impeaching defendants with evidence of
their insurance coverage.
Also during the survey period, the court of appeals reaffirmed the
principle that the admission of collateral source evidence is not
reversible error when a jury reaches a defense verdict because such
evidence relates only to the issue of damages and, if a defendant prevails
on the issue of liability, it must be presumed that the jurors did not
reach the issue of damages."' This, of course, is a sore point for the
plaintiff's bar who understandably assume that such evidence could have
a profound impact even on jurors who reach a defense verdict.
E. Offers of Compromise or Payment
The court of appeals continues to struggle with the issue of whether
an offer to pay an injured party's medical expenses is relevant as an
admission of liability. In Rosequist v. Pratt,"7 a decision discussed in
a previous survey,"' the court rejected a trial court's reasoning that
such offers amount to an attempt to settle a claim and, thus, are
inadmissible." 9 The court nevertheless affirmed the trial court
because the offer was not an admission of liability, but was rather "'a
voluntary offer of assistance made on the impulse of benevolence or
sympathy.'"' ° This issue was again presented to the court of appeals
during the current survey period.

116. Henry v. Watkins, 219 Ga.App. 80, 81, 464 S.E.2d 215, 216 (1995).
117. 201 Ga. App. 45, 410 S.E.2d 316 (1991).
118. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 44 MERCER L. REV. 213, 222-23 (1992).
119. 201 Ga. App. at 46, 410 S.E.2d at 318.

120. Id. (quoting Gray v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 127 Ga. App. 45, 53, 192 S.E.2d 521, 526
(1972)).
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In Neubert v. Vigh,' 2 ' plaintiff sought to recover damages for injuries
suffered by her son in a collision with a car driven by defendant's son.
Plaintiff contended that defendant was liable for the negligence of his
son. However, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
defendant, apparently because the son took the car without defendant's
permission while defendant was out of town and the son had been
staying with another family. On appeal, plaintiff contended summary
judgment was improper because defendant's offer to pay medical bills
constituted an admission of liability. The majority, in a full court
opinion, acknowledged authority that offers to pay medical bills
constitute admissions of liability.122 Although this authority had not
been overruled, the court noted that "more recent cases demonstrate that
it is not controlling." 2 3 Relying on Rosequist and other authority, the
court noted that voluntary offers of assistance motivated by benevolence
or sympathy are not relevant to prove an admission of liability.'2
With no meaningful substantive discussion, the majority held that
defendant's statements fell in the latter category.125 The majority did
note that defendant was not actually involved in the collision, perhaps
suggesting that a different result might have been reached had the offer
been made by a party actually causing a plaintiff's injuries.' 26
In a special concurrence, Chief Judge Beasley and Judge Ruffin
arrived at the same result, but with different reasoning. They noted
that plaintiff did not challenge the trial court's conclusion that, as a
matter of law, defendant could not be liable for his son's negligence. 27
Rather, plaintiff argued, in effect, that even though defendant could not
be legally liable, he could nevertheless be held liable because his offer to
pay medical expenses was an admission of liability. Judge Beasley
found no authority for this position. 21 "An admission of liability has
efficacy only if there is liability. If there is none, then the statements of
the alleged tortfeasor constitute merely expressions of sympathy,
benevolence, or an acceptance of moral responsibility."'2 9 Chief Judge
Beasley noted that the father's statements could be either based on
sympathy or benevolence or could be an admission of liability; a jury

121. 218 Ga. App. 693, 462 S.E.2d 808 (1995).

122. Id. at 694, 462 S.E.2d at 809.
123. Id.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id., 462 S.E.2d at 809-10.
Id.
Id. at 695, 462 S.E.2d at 810.

128. Id.
129. Id.
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would have to decide which was the case.13 However, because it was
uncontroverted that the father breached no duty, it was not necessary
for a jury to make that determination.
Presiding Judge McMurray dissented. 3 ' He worried that the
majority's opinion could be read to hold that any offers to pay medical
bills were inadmissible as an admission of liability because they are
deemed to be based on benevolence or sympathy. This, Judge McMurray
wrote, was not the law.32 Rather, the law recognizes that such
statements may either be construed as admissions of liability or as
expressions of sympathy depending on the facts of the particular cases.
In some cases, it can be held as a matter of law that they constitute
expressions or statements of sympathy. Here, however, Judge McMurray found a jury issue as to whether defendant's offers to pay medical
expenses were an admission of liability or an expression of sorrow or
sympathy."
F

Admissions Against Interest
In Cannon v. Street,"a4 the court of appeals, with little discussion,
rendered a decision of great significance to personal injury lawyers. In
Cannon, defendant was charged with running a red light. Rather than
contesting the charge, he paid a fine and failed to appear at the hearing.
In a civil action arising from the offense, the trial court granted
plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of
defendant's liability. Defendant appealed, contending, among other
things, that a factual issue existed with regard to his negligence,
specifically, whether he ran the red light.' 3 The court of appeals
disagreed, holding that when defendant posted a cash bond and failed
to appear in court to contest the charge against him, he effectively
3
admitted he "ran the red light as alleged in the traffic citation."' 6
Before plaintiff's lawyers celebrate Cannon, they should consider
Waszczak u. Warner Robins,"37 which was decided after the conclusion
of the survey period, but which will nevertheless be addressed. In
Waszczak, defendant was also charged with failure to yield the right-ofway and paid a fine. Nevertheless, the trial court did not admit

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id. at 696, 462 S.E.2d at 811.
Id.
Id. at 697, 462 S.E.2d at 811.
220 Ga. App. 212, 469 S.E.2d 343 (1996).
Id. at 213-14, 469 S.E.2d at 345.
Id. at 214, 469 S.E.2d at 345.
221 Ga. App. 528, 471 S.E.2d 572 (1996).
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evidence of thesq. facts. 3 ' The court of appeals acknowledged that a
guilty plea, as opposed to a guilty adjudication, is admissible in a civil
Here, however, defendant appeared in court initially, but
action.'
subsequently paid the fine before he was scheduled to reappear in court.
This, for some reason, was significant to the court which characterized
defendant's conduct as something less than a total failure to appear in
court, which was the case in Cannon." The court further distinguished Cannon on the grounds that the defendant in Cannon acknowledged his guilt in ways other than merely paying the fine. 14' The
court distinguished O.C.G.A. section 40-13-58, which provides that a
party is deemed to have pleaded guilty when he posts a cash bond and
subsequently forfeits the bond by failing to appear, because defendant
appeared in court initially."" The fact that defendant's traffic citation
bore the stamp "collateral forfeited" and the municipal court clerk
testified that this was a bond forfeiture and an admission of guilt, did
not sway the court; the court said, "[t]here are many reasons why an
individual may choose to pay the fine rather than appear in court." 143
In the opinion of the author, Cannon and its progeny, on the one hand,
and Waszczak on the other hand, cannot be distinguished. Surely, it
cannot be significant that the defendant in Cannon paid his fine before
his first appearance in court and the defendant in Waszczak paid his fine
after an initial appearance, but before his second appearance. In both
cases, the defendants paid fines rather than contesting the charges
against them.
III.

PRIVILEGES

Georgia courts rendered two decisions during the survey period
addressing the marital privilege, neither of which broke new ground. In
Helton v. State,4 the court of appeals held that the marital privilege
does not bar the admission of testimony by a witness who overheard
communications between spouses." In Frazier v. State,'4 6 defendant
asserted that communications with his common-law wife were privileged
and, therefore, his wife's testimony was improperly admitted. However,
the trial court found that defendant had not carried his burden of
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 528-29, 471 S.E.2d at 574.
Id. at 529, 471 S.E.2d at 574.
Id.
Id.

142. Id.
143. Id.
144.

217 Ga. App. 691, 458 S.E.2d 872 (1995).

145. Id. at 692, 458 S.E,2d at 874.
146.

219 Ga.App. 768, 467 S.E.2d 338 (1995).
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proving that the witness was defendant's wife.1 47 The court of appeals
affirmed, noting that it was defendant's burden to prove the existence of
a common-law marriage and that the trial court's conclusion in this
regard is subject to the any evidence standard of review."4 The court
concluded that some evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that
the witness was not defendant's common-law wife and, therefore, her
testimony was properly admitted. 49
IV

WITNESSES

Examination and Impeachment of Witnesses Generally
Two decisions by the court of appeals during the survey period
underscore the need for lawyers to be mindful that they do not "open the
door" to the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence. In Charlton
v. State,15 ° the officer who arrested defendant for driving under the
influence (DUI) failed to advise defendant of his rights relating to
alcohol tests. Accordingly, the trial court refused to admit the results of
the tests at defendant's subsequent trial. However, defendant, in the
presentation of his case, adduced expert testimony to the effect that,
given defendant's testimony that he drank only four beers earlier in the
day, the amount of alcohol in his body at the time of his arrest would
have been only a trace. The trial court then allowed the State to rebut
this evidence with testimony from its own expert who agreed that if
defendant had only drank four beers, the amount of alcohol in his
system would have been negligible. However, because he registered .08
grams on the alcohol test administered at the time of his arrest, he
consumed seven or eight beers rather than the
would have had to have
151
four he admitted to.
The court of appeals rejected defendant's contention that the trial
court improperly admitted the results of the alcohol test to rebut his
expert testimony.152 The parameters of permissible impeachment
evidence, the court noted, are extremely broad.1 55 "The right to
impeach a defendant or witness, as set forth in O.C.G.A. section 24-9-82,
is one of the cornerstones of the adversarial process. Even evidence
which violates constitutional standards of due process, such as unlawful-

A.

147. Id. at 768-69, 467 S.E.2d at 340.
148. Id. at 770, 467 S.E.2d at 341.
149. Id.

150. 217 Ga. App. 842, 459 S.E.2d 455 (1995).
151. Id. at 842-43, 459 S.E.2d at 456.
152. Id. at 844, 459 S.E.2d at 457.

153. Id., 459 S.E.2d at 456.
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ly obtained confessions, may be admitted for impeachment purposes. " " The court concluded that the intoximeter results were admissible to impeach defendant's testimony regarding the amount of beer he
drank.155 Also, the test results were admissible to impeach the
testimony of defendant's expert that his alcohol concentration would not
have been in excess of .05 grams at the time of his arrest. 56
Charlton may be troubling to criminal defense lawyers. Clearly, the
defense of any DUI charge will involve a contention that a defendant
had not consumed sufficient alcohol to be convicted. However, under the
reasoning of Charlton,this defense could allow the prosecution to tender
the results of a suppressed alcohol test. Perhaps Charlton will not be
read so broadly. For example, it may be significant in Charlton that the
defendant relied upon expert testimony concerning the precise amount
of alcohol concentration that was clearly inconsistent with the suppressed intoximeter result.
In Hudson v. State,'5 7 defendant contended that his trial counsel was
ineffective because he failed to object properly to the admission of
evidence concerning defendant's apparent homosexual encounters with
young boys. The trial court refused to admit this evidence during the
State's case-in-chief, but when defendant testified that he was not a
homosexual, the trial court allowed the State to rebut this testimony
with the previously excluded evidence.
The court of appeals held
that defendant's trial counsel's "unsuccessful attempt to exclude this
relevant impeachment testimony"'59 did not constitute ineffective
assistance." 6
The court of appeals decision in Price v. State'.' illustrates the
strong bias of Georgia law against bolstering a witness' credibility
through the testimony of another witness. In Price,defendant, who was
convicted of molesting and sodomizing his step-daughters, contended
that the trial court improperly allowed a social worker to testify about
her observations of and conversations with the children's mother. The
social worker testified that the mother initially did not believe her
daughters' claims, but, after watching a videotape of their statements,
concluded they were telling the truth.6 2 The court of appeals rejected
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defendant's contention that this testimony was hearsay because the
mother testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination.'6
However, the court of appeals agreed that this testimony constituted
improper bolstering of the children's credibility."l '
B. Impeachment by Evidence of Character
As discussed above, extrinsic act evidence is supposedly generally
inadmissible when offered for substantive purposes. Such evidence is
also inadmissible to impeach or bolster witnesses. This principle,
however, is subject to many exceptions. For example, Georgia law
permits the use of general bad character evidence to impeach a witness
other than a criminal defendant. 165 Even criminal defendants who
open the door to general bad character evidence can be impeached with
Before the supreme
evidence of specific instances of misconduct.'
court decision in Jones v. State,'67 an adroit prosecutor could easily
place a defendant in a position which opened the door to cross-examination about prior misconduct. Prior to Jones, courts routinely held that
a defendant places his character in issue and thus is subject to impeachment with character evidence if he testifies to less than all of his prior
criminal conduct. In Jones, the court held that a defendant only places
his character in issue when he makes an express election to do so.'
This was the case in Campbell v. State.60 On direct examination,
defendant testified about his charitable and community activities. The
prosecution then successfully sought a ruling that defendant had placed
his character at issue and tendered evidence of defendant's prior traffic
convictions. 70 Relying on Jones, defendant argued that he did not
intentionally place his character at issue, but the court of appeals easily
rejected this argument. 7 ' Although defendant contended that the
evidence in question was introduced simply to show that he was active
in the community, it clearly was intended to prove his good character
and, thus, opened the door to the evidence of his prior misconduct.

163. Id.
164. Id., 469 S.E.2d at 335.
165. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84 (1994).
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Id. at 758, 363 S.E.2d at 534.
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OPINION TESTIMONY

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,172 the United
States Supreme Court, in a dramatic departure from prior practice,
overruled Frye v. United States, 7 ' rejecting the longstanding Frye test
for determining whether novel or experimental test procedures or other
matters that are the subject of expert testimony have become sufficiently
established to be admissible in court. 74 In Orkin Exterminating Co.
v. McIntosh, 7 ' discussed in last year's survey, 7 ' the court of appeals
refused to adopt the Daubert test and reaffirmed the test traditionally
applied by Georgia courts which requires a determination that the
evidence in77 question has reached a "'scientific stage of verifiable
certainty.'"1
During the current survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals, in
Jordan v. Georgia Power Co.,17' reaffirmed that Daubert has not been
adopted in Georgia. 79 In Jordan, plaintiffs contended that the trial
court erred in allowing defendant's experts to testify regarding "consensus in the scientific community."" s The court of appeals agreed and
reversed.'
The court's reasoning suggests two bases for its conclusion. First, in
its discussion of Daubert,the court noted that the admissibility of expert
testimony in Georgia is not determined "by simply calculating the
consensus in the scientific community.'" 8 2 Thus, the court seemed to
suggest that "consensus" testimony is irrelevant.'
Second, an expert
may not base his opinion upon the opinions of others, although an expert
may base his opinion upon facts testified to by other witnesses."
For a number of years, the author has attempted to catalogue the
numerous cases in which the courts have struggled with the issue of
whether expert testimony is admissible in criminal cases to prove or

172. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
173. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
174. 509 U.S. at 587.
175. 215 Ga. App. 587, 452 S.E.2d 159 (1994).
176. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 47 MERCER L. REV. 127, 144-45 (1995).
177. 215 Ga. App. at 593, 452 S.E.2d at 165 (quoting Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 525,
292 S.E.2d 389, 395 (1982)).
178. 219 Ga. App. 690, 466 S.E.2d 601 (1995).
179. Id. at 692-93, 466 S.E.2d at 604.
180. Id. at 692, 466 S.E.2d at 604.
181. Id. at 696, 466 S.E.2d at 607.
182. Id. at 693, 466 S.E.2d 605 (quoting Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 525, 292 S.E.2d
389, 396 (1982)).
183. Id.
184. Id.
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disprove that a victim or defendant suffered from one of various
syndromes such as abused child syndrome. As discussed in last year's
survey," Judge Andrews blasted efforts to bring "soft science" such as
battered wife syndrome, abused child syndrome, post traumatic stress
syndrome, and even urban survival syndrome into the courtroom.'"
However, Judge Andrews acknowledged that the supreme court opened
the door to at least some testimony of this nature, and the court of
appeals had no power to close it. 8" Rather, "the best we can do is to
continue to screen out other dubious syndromes as they are imagined
and promoted by individuals who need to explain away their conduct." ' Judge Andrews' commentary may seem a little harsh, but the
court of appeals, and now the supreme court, seems intent upon
narrowing the scope of admissible syndrome evidence. For example, the
supreme court, in Johnson v. State,l" 9 affirmed the trial court's refusal
to admit expert testimony that defendant, a male, suffered symptoms of
posttraumatic stress disorder and that defendant's actions were
"activated and driven by the same psychological dynamics as those in
the battered woman syndrome."" The court seemed to want to make
clear that evidence of the battered woman syndrome is admissible in
cases in which a wife is charged with the murder of her husband
because of unique social and economic factors and would not be extended
to other situations in which a defendant claims justification for his
conduct. 9 '
Consistent with this newly found disdain for soft science, the court of
appeals seemed to delight in reversing defendant's conviction in Flowers
v. State'92 because of the admission of expert testimony based on
something called a "credibility enhancement technique." 93 Surely, it
would seem that an expert seeking to ply his trade as an expert witness
would find a better name for his technique. Such a name almost assures
that a court will find that the expert's testimony constitutes improper
bolstering of a witness. The credibility enhancement technique clearly,
and almost admittedly, amounted to nothing more than an opinion that
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a victim was telling the truth and, thus, was an improper attempt to
bolster the victim's credibility."9
The court of appeals decision in Drummond v. Gladson"95 is significant for two reasons. First, it arguably lends some support to the
proposition that a party must tender an expert witness and that the trial
court must find that the expert is, in tact, an expert before that expert
can render opinion testimony. As noted in last year's survey, there is no
explicit requirement under Georgia law that a party "tender an expert"
or obtain a court's ruling that a witness is qualified to testify as an
expert.'96
Second, the opinion perhaps sheds some light on a recurrent issue-the extent to which investigating police officers can give opinion
testimony in civil suits arising from accidents they investigated. In
Drummond, the trial court admitted a diagram prepared by the
investigating officer that indicated plaintiff was driving his vehicle on
the wrong side of the road."9 7 With little discussion, the court held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this
exhibit.'98 In a special concurrence, Chief Judge Beasley, joined by
Judge Ruffin, elaborated. 9 The trial court did not permit the officer
to testify about his conclusions regarding the path of the motorcycle
prior to the collision because that would amount to an opinion as to who
was at fault. This testimony was properly excluded.20 0 The court
instructed the police officer to testify about the path of the vehicle based
on factors other than the physical evidence at the scene.20 The exhibit
at issue, on the other hand, simply depicted the skid marks which the
officer testified that he observed at the scene. 0 2

194. Id. at 816, 468 S.E.2d at 202.
195. 219 Ga. App. 521, 465 S.E.2d 687 (1995).
196. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 47 MERCER L. REV. 127, 141-42 (1995).
197. 219 Ga. App. at 521-22, 465 S.E.2d at 688.
198. Id. at 522, 465 S.E.2d at 688.
199. Id. at 523-25, 465 S.E.2d at 689-90 (Beasley, C.J., concurring).
200. Id. at 523-24, 465 S.E.2d at 689.
201. Id. at 524, 465 S.E.2d at 689.
202. Drummondalso includes an interesting debate concerning whether it is necessary
to file a complete copy of a trial transcript. The majority of the three judge panel chastised
the plaintiffs for not filing the entire transcript. However, Chief Judge Beasley and Judge
Ruffin, in their concurring opinion, praised the plaintiffs for filing only those portions of
the transcript necessary to a resolution of the sole issue on appeal. The rationale for
allowing an appeal to proceed with less than an entire trial transcript is compelling.
Transcripts are expensive and often only a small portion of the transcript is relevant to
issues on appeal. Clearly, however, given the split of appellate opinion, lawyers should
continue to file transcripts in their entirety.
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SEQUESTRATION

The rule of sequestration in Georgia is generally applied strictly, even
to the point, in some cases, that parties are sequestered from the
courtroom.'0 3 In Tdwell v. State,'0 the court of appeals was not as
willing to apply the rule quite so rigidly. In 7ldwell, defendant, who
was charged with child molestation, contended that the trial court erred
when it allowed the victim's mother to remain in the courtroom during
the victim's testimony even though the mother later testified.' 6 The
court of appeals noted that O.CG.A. section 24-9-61 provides for
sequestration of witnesses "only 'as far as practicable and convenient,
but no mere irregularity shall exclude a witness.'" 2°0 The court did not
quote the portion of O.C.G.A. section 24-9-61 that grants parties "the
right to have the witnesses of the other party examined out of the
hearing of each other."2° In addition, the court cited Lee v. State20 8
for the proposition that a trial court has discretion to make exceptions
to the rule, but did not acknowledge that Lee involved a witness who
was not subject to the rule of sequestration. 2' Nevertheless, the court
held that "under
the facts of this case, we find no abuse of the court's
21 0
discretion."

VII.

HEARSAY

A.

Statements by Co-Conspirators
In Bundrage v. State,21 the supreme court struggled with a complicated factual scenario that presented difficult evidentiary issues. In
Bundrage, the State contended Bundrage was one of three men who
committed a murder. One conspirator pled guilty to lesser charges and
cooperated with law enforcement authorities. The authorities recorded
a telephone conversation between this conspirator and the third
conspirator in which the third conspirator implicated Bundrage. Over
Bundrage's objection, the trial court admitted a tape of the recorded call
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Barber v. Barber, 257 Ga. 488, 360 S.E.2d 574 (1987).
219 Ga. App. 233, 464 S.E.2d 834 (1995).
Id. at 238, 464 S.E.2d at 839.
Id. at 239, 464 S.E.2d at 839.
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-61 (1994).
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219 Ga. App. at 239, 464 S.E.2d at 839.
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211, 265 Ga. 813, 462 S.E.2d 719 (1995).
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into evidence.21 The supreme court first addressed whether the third
conspirator's statements on the tape were properly admitted.2 13
Statements of co-conspirators are admissible pursuant to O.C.G.A.
section 24-3-5 if the statements are made during the course of the
conspiracy. A statement is considered to have been made during the
course of the conspiracy if it is made during the concealment phase of
the conspiracy. 21' Because the third conspirator was still attempting
to conceal his role in the conspiracy, the supreme court reasoned that his
statements were admissible pursuant to the co-conspirator exception to
the hearsay rule. 5 The court then noted that the cooperating conspirator's statements did not affect the admissibility of the third conspirator's statements because the cooperating conspirator "could have related
[the statements] if he had been a witness."216 The import of this
reasoning is not clear, and, as discussed below, it disturbed two
dissenting justices.
The court then turned to the statements by the cooperating conspirator that were a part of the recorded conversation. Because the coconspirator was not a participant in the conspiracy at the time of his
statements, the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule would not
provide a basis for the admission of his statements.2 17 Citing Professor
Green's treatise on evidence, the court noted that these statements were
offered only for the limited purpose of showing the content of the third
conspirator's statements.2 8 Statements offered merely as a part of the
circumstances of an occurrence are not offered to prove the truth of the
statements and, therefore, are not hearsay.21 9 Moreover, out-of-court
statements may be admissible to explain conduct and motives and, if
offered for this purpose, are not hearsay.
It follows that [the third conspirator's] statements in the recorded call
would be admissible as part of reciprocal and integrated utterances
between him and [the cooperating conspirator], for the limited purpose
of putting [the cooperating conspirator's] responses in context and

212.
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215.
216.
217.

Id. at
Id. at
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813-14, 462 S.E.2d at 721.
813, 462 S.E.2d at 721.

813-14, 462 S.E.2d at 721.
814, 462 S.E.2d at 721.
813-14, 462 S.E.2d at 721.
218. Id. at 814, 462 S.E.2d at 721 (citing THOMAS F. GREEN, JR., GEORGIA LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 288 (4th ed. 1994)).
219. Id. (citing GREEN, supra note 218, at § 288).
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making [these] statements intelligible to the jury and recognizable as
the statements of a co-conspirator22

Justices Sears and Fletcher, although concurring in the majority's
result, expressed disapproval of the majority's reasoning. In her
concurring opinion, Justice Sears interpreted the majority opinion to
advance two bases for the admission of the co-conspirator's statement.221 First, the majority found the statement to be admissible as
a statement by a co-conspirator. Justice Sears agreed with this conclusion. 222 Second, she read the majority opinion to hold that the coconspirator's statement was also admissible because the cooperating coconspirator could have testified to these statements if he had been called
as a witness.223 Justice Sears found this reasoning "unnecessary and

dangerous."2 24 It was unnecessary because the co-conspirator's statements were admissible pursuant to the co-conspirator's exception to the
hearsay rule. It was "dangerous because it implies that the fact that a
person could have testified in court is an exception to the hearsay rule
and renders out-of-court statements admissible."2 25 Justice Sears
expressed concern that the majority's opinion, and the authority upon
which it relied, could be interpreted to create a broad exception to the
hearsay rule, an exception that would render an out-of-court statement
admissible for no reason other than that the declarant could have come
into court and testified.226
Turning to the cooperating co-conspirator's statements, Justice Sears
could not agree with the majority's reasoning that these statements were
admissible under O.C.G.A. section 24-3-2 for the limited purpose of
placing the third conspirator's statements in context and not to prove the
truth of the cooperating co-conspirator's statements.2 27

Justice Sears

found the majority's reliance on Green to be misplaced because these
statements were not part of the surrounding circumstances of an
occurrence. 22 Nor could she agree with the reasoning that these
statements were admissible to explain the third conspirator's conduct or

220. Id. The court relied upon a federal case, United States v. Gutierrez-Chavez, 842
F.2d 77, 81 (5th Cir. 1988), to support this proposition. The Eleventh Circuit has reached
a similar conclusion. See United States v. Byrom, 910 F.2d 725, 732 (11th Cir. 1990),
discussed in Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 42 MERCER L. REv. 1451, 1474-75 (1991).

221. 265 Ga. at 816, 426 S.E.2d at 722-23.
222. Id., 426 S.E.2d at 723.
223.

Id. at 816-17, 426 S.E.2d at 723.

224. Id. at 816, 462 S.E.2d at 722-23.
225. Id., 462 S.E.2d at 723.

226. Id. at 816-17, 462 S.E.2d at 723.
227.

Id. at 817-18, 462 S.E.2d at 723-24.

228. Id., 462 S.E.2d at 724.
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motives. 29 Finally, she could not agree with the majority's reliance on
United States v. Gutierrez-Chaezs° because these statements did
more than put the third conspirator's statements in context.231 Justice
Sears quoted portions of the recorded conversation indicating that the
statements, by themselves, established nothing.2 2 Only if one accepted the cooperating conspirator's statements to be true would the third
conspirator's statements have any significance.
Nevertheless, Justice Sears agreed with the majority's result because
she concluded that the cooperating conspirator's statements were
admissible as adoptive admissions."' Although Georgia law does not
expressly recognize an adoptive admission exception to the hearsay rule
such as that found in Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(b), Justice
Sears noted that O.C.G.A. section 24-3-36 provides that "'[a]cquiescence
or silence, when the circumstances require an answer, a denial, or other
conduct, may amount to an admission.'"2 34 In any event, Justice Sears
noted that the statutory exceptions to the rule against hearsay are not
exhaustive, and a statement may be admitted in the absence of an
express hearsay exception if there is a great necessity for the statement
23 5
to be admitted and the statement is sufficiently trustworthy.
Justice Sears recognized one potential problem with her analysis.23
In Jarrett v. State,237 a decision discussed in last year's survey,238 the
supreme court held that O.C.G.A. section 24-3-36 does not allow the
admission of hearsay statements based on a defendant's silence. 9
Justice Sears distinguished Jarrett because the statements were not
being admitted based on defendant's silence, but rather, on the basis of
the third conspirator's silence.2 ° In short, Justice Sears concluded
that the cooperating conspirator's statements were admissible because
the third conspirator adopted these statements as his own, and the third
conspirator's statements were admissible against defendant pursuant to
the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.
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Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 47 MERCER L. REv. 127, 146-47 (1995).
265 Ga. at 28.29, 453 S.E.2d at 462-63.
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The Necessity Exception
The evolution of what can now be termed Georgia's necessity exception
to the rule against hearsay is both remarkable and troubling. It is
remarkable because it dramatically increases the instances in which
hearsay statements may be admitted even though they do not fall within
a firmly established exception to the hearsay rule. It is troubling for the
same reason, particularly in criminal cases, where the admission of such
statements seems to raise troubling constitutional issues.
As discussed below, O.C.G.A. section 24-3-1(b) has been cited as the
basis for the necessity objection, but it would seem that this provision
provides, at best, shaky support for the far-reaching decisions of the
court of appeals and supreme court. By its terms, O.C.G.A. section 24-31(b) appears to limit the use of hearsay evidence, noting that hearsay
evidence is admissible "only in specified cases from necessity."242 Ten
years ago, research would have indicated that the specified cases
referred to firmly established statutory and common law exceptions to
the hearsay rule. However, beginning with McKissick v. State,243 the
courts began reading O.C.G.A. section 24-3-1(b) expansively rather than
restrictively. In McKissick, the court noted that O.C.G.A. section 24-31(b) "permits the use of hearsay evidence 'in specified cases from
necessity.'" 2 " Missing from the court's quotation of the statute, of
course, is the word only. In McKissick, the court went on to note that
the statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule were not exhaustive and
that hearsay evidence could be admitted in the absence of a statutory
and 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiexception if "'necessity'
245
B.

ness' are established."

Also left unsaid in McKissick was the fact that its rationale was based
upon confrontation clause analysis intended to determine when hearsay
evidence can be admitted without violating a defendant's constitutional
rights. As discussed in previous surveys addressing Georgia and
Eleventh Circuit evidence decisions, a hearsay statement, even though
admissible pursuant to some exception to the hearsay rule, may
nevertheless violate a defendant's right to confront the witnesses
The supreme court has held that
providing evidence against him.'

242.

O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1(b) (1994) (emphasis added).

243. 263 Ga. 188, 429 S.E.2d 655 (1993), discussed in Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 46
MERCER L. REv. 233, 255 (1994).

244. 263 Ga. at 189, 429 S.E.2d at 657 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1(b)).
245. Id. (quoting Mallory v. State, 261 Ga. 625, 627, 409 S.E.2d 839, 841 (1991)).
246. See, e.g., Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 42 MERCER L. REV. 223, 251-52 (1990);
Evidence, 45 MERCER L. REV. 229, 247-48 (1993).
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hearsay evidence may be admitted in criminal trials if it is necessary
and if the statement has "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."2 Trustworthiness is generally established by the fact that the
hearsay statement falls within a firmly established exception to the
hearsay rule. It is difficult to see how the new necessity exception can
be considered firmly established. However, the fact that the hearsay
statement is not admissible pursuant to a firmly established exception
is not a fatal constitutional flaw. The statement may, nevertheless, be
admissible if the requisite trustworthiness can be established.' 4 The
problem is the court's recent fondness for the necessity exception raises
constitutional issues that the Georgia courts typically do not address.
For example, during the current survey period, the trial court, in
Drane v. State,249 admitted statements made by defendant's commonlaw wife to law enforcement authorities. In a terse opinion, the supreme
court found that the statements were both necessary and trustworthy
and, thus, were admissible.250 Their admission was necessary because
the wife invoked her marital privilege not to testify. The statements
were trustworthy because they were made to a Georgia Bureau of
Investigation agent during an "official investigation"5 1 and because
the wife never disavowed her statements.252
More thoughtful analysis is found in Fenimore v. State."'3 In
Fenimore,defendant was tried and convicted of credit card fraud based
on allegations that he took advantage of an intoxicated customer to place
charges on his credit card that the customer did not actually incur. The
customer committed suicide prior to trial.2
The evolution of the
necessity exception is demonstrated by the court of appeals statement
that "the State sought to invoke OCGA § 24-3-1(b)'s unavailable-witness
exception to the hearsay rule as a basis for admitting transcripts of
taped statements made by" the customer.2 5 Thus, O.C.G.A. section 24-3-1(b) can now be cited as the basis for the necessity exception
to the hearsay rule. Turning to the customer's statements, the court
acknowledged that the necessity requirement was satisfied because the

247. See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992); Bourjaily v. United States, 483
U.S. 171 (1987) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 57 (1980)).
248. See, e.g., United States v. Deeb, 13 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1994).
249. 265 Ga. 663, 461 S.E.2d 224 (1995).
250. Id. at 664, 461 S.E.2d at 224-25.
251. Id., 461 S.E.2d at 225.

252. Id.
253. 218 Ga. App. 735, 463 S.E.2d 55 (1995).

254. Id. at 735-36, 463 S.E.2d at 56-57.
255. Id. at 736, 218 S.E.2d at 56.
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However, the court carefully analyzed the
customer was dead.2
circumstances surrounding the statements and concluded that they did
not satisfy the trustworthiness requirement.257 The court tracked the
constitutional analysis of Ohio v. Roberts2" and Idaho v. Wright 9
noting that because the statements did not fall within a firmly estabThese
lished hearsay exception, careful analysis was required. 2'
circumstances, the court found, did not sufficiently indicate reliability to
satisfy the trustworthiness requirement.20 ' Although the statements
were, to some extent, corroborated by other non-hearsay evidence, the
court, quoting Wright, found that corroboration did not establish
trustworthiness, but rather is relevant to the issue of whether the
admission of the hearsay statement was harmful error.262 The error
in this case, the court held, was not harmless and, therefore, reversed
defendant's conviction. 2
The supreme court found harmless error in Jordan u. State.2 " In
Jordan, the trial court admitted testimony regarding statements
allegedly made by the deceased victim concerning defendant's threats
against the victim. 26 The court acknowledged the necessity exception
to the hearsay rule and the necessity of the statements because of the
victim's death, but nevertheless found that they were not sufficiently
trustworthy to satisfy the necessity exception.2 This error, however,
was harmless.6 7
The utility of the necessity exception to prosecutors is demonstrated
by the supreme Court's decision in Luallen v. State.2,8 In Luallen, the
trial court permitted a police officer to testify that defendant's husband
said in defendant's presence that defendant killed the victim. Defendant
remained silent when this statement was made. The trial court
admitted this hearsay testimony pursuant to the hearsay exception that
allows the admission of a statement made in a party's presence.26 9
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Fenimore, 218 Ga. App. at 737, 463 S.E.2d at 57.
Id. at 739, 218 Ga. App. at 58.
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266 Ga. 499, 467 S.E.2d 568 (1996).
Id. at 500, 467 S.E.2d at 570.
Id. at 500-01, 467 S.E.2d at 570.
Id. at 501, 467 S.E.2d at 570.
266 Ga. 174, 465 S.E.2d 672 (1996).
Id. at 178, 465 S.E.2d at 676.
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However, the supreme court, following Jarrett v. State,27 held that
this exception cannot be used to admit hearsay against a criminal defendant."' Nevertheless, the court found another basis for the admission
of the statement: the necessity exception. 7
The husband did not
testify at trial and, therefore, the necessity requirement was satisfied.
The trustworthiness requirement was satisfied because the husband
"gave the statement immediately upon meeting the sergeant in order to
initiate an official investigation into the victim's death; there is no
indication the husband ever recanted or sought to change his statement;
and his statement recounts matters later corroborated by other
evidence.2 73
Thus, it seems that in a remarkably short period of time the necessity
exception to the hearsay rule has become firmly established in Georgia.
Surely, however, it can be questioned whether the sometimes loose
analysis of hearsay evidence entered pursuant to the necessity exception
satisfies the rigid requirements of the confrontation clause. It is also
ironic that the necessity exception appears to be exclusively applied in
criminal cases where the confrontation clause stands as an impediment
to the admission of hearsay statements. This is not true in civil cases
where the confrontation clause does not stand as such an impediment.
One can argue that if hearsay evidence can be so freely admitted in
criminal cases then, surely, in civil cases, the hearsay rule has been
substantially abrogated.
C.

PriorOut-of-Court Statements
Georgia has two rather unusual rules regarding the admissibility of
prior statements by witnesses. In Gibbons v. State,274 the supreme
court held that prior inconsistent statements of a witness are admissible
as substantive evidence if the witness is subject to cross-examination.275 In Cuzzort v. State,276 the supreme court, in apparent frustration over the inability to secure convictions in child molestation cases
prior to the enactment of the Child Hearsay Statute, held that a prior
consistent statement is admissible as substantive evidence against an

270. 265 Ga. 28, 453 S.E.2d 461.
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accused if the witness is present at the trial and subject to crossexamination.277
278
During the survey period, the supreme court, in Brown v. State,
relied upon Gibbons to affirm defendant's murder conviction.279 In
Brown, the statement at issue was made by defendant's co-conspirator,
but was made after the termination of the conspiracy. Thus, defendant
contended that O.C.G.A. section 24-3-52, the co-conspirator exception to
the hearsay rule, barred the admission of the statement. 280 The
supreme court disagreed. 21 1 O.C.G.A. section 24-3-52 applies to
hearsay statements by a co-conspirator who does not testify at trial. If
the co-conspirator testifies, O.C.G.A. section 24-3-52 is not applicable.
Thus, if the co-conspirator testifies inconsistently with his prior
statement, the prior statement is admissible, pursuant to Gibbons, as
substantive evidence. Defendant contended, however, that a prior
inconsistent statement may not be admitted when the witness simply
testifies that he does not remember the events in question.8 2 Indeed,
in Johnson v. State218 the supreme court held that "'where a witness
merely states that he does not remember, he cannot be impeached by the
showing of former statements with respect to the facts which he claims
Acknowledging the holding of Johnson, the
not to remember. ' "2
supreme court concluded that it simply did not apply because, upon
examination of the co-conspirator's trial testimony, his testimony
amounted to more than a simple inability to remember.28 8
D. Miscellaneous
Adams v. State286 is a case that makes you want to scratch your
head in bewilderment. In defendant's prosecution for forgery, the trial
court admitted affidavits from officials of various companies allegedly
victimized by defendant. The affidavits were obtained by "fraud

277. Id. at 745, 334 S.E.2d at 662.
278. 266 Ga. 633, 469 S.E.2d 186 (1996).
279. Id. at 635, 469 S.E.2d at 187.

280. Id.
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Id., 469 S.E.2d at 187-88.

282. Id., 469 S.E.2d at 188.
283. 255 Ga. 552, 341 S.E.2d 220 (1986).
284. 266 Ga. at 635,469 S.E.2d at 188 (quoting Johnson v. State, 255 Ga. 552,556,341
S.E.2d 220, 223 (1986)).

285. Id. at 635-36, 469 S.E.2d at 188. See also Knight v. State, 266 Ga. 47, 464 S.E.2d
201 (1995), in which the supreme court also relied upon Gibbons to affirm defendant's
conviction.

286. 217 Ga. App. 706, 459 S.E.2d 182 (1995).
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investigators" acting on behalf of the banks that paid forged checks. 7
The affidavits were admitted as business records based upon testimony
by the investigators that they were made in the normal course of the
banks' business at or near the time of the alleged forgeries. Although
not clear from the opinion, defendant apparently objected to the
affidavits on the grounds that the prosecution had not laid a proper
However, as
foundation for their admissibility as business records.'
noted by the court of appeals, there was a more "fundamental" problem:
how in the world can an affidavit be admissible to begin with, apart
from the question of whether or not it is a business record?2 .9 Clearly,
an affidavit cannot be admitted in lieu of a witness' testimony. In
criminal cases, the admission of testimonial affidavits implicates the
confrontation clause. However, even in a civil case, it is difficult to see
how an affidavit can be admitted in lieu of a witness' testimony. While
business records may be admitted, the fact that the records are business
records must be first established by testimony and the "fraud investigators" certainly could not establish that affidavits implicating defendant
were prepared in the normal course of business.
VIII. AUTHENTICATION
In State v. Berky,' a decision discussed in depth in last year's
survey,"" a closely divided court of appeals held that a videotape
allegedly depicting defendant driving under the influence of alcohol was
admissible even though the police officer who shot the videotape had
died and, thus, was unavailable to authenticate the videotape at
trial.292 The court adopted what has been called the "silent witness"
rationale for admitting the evidence.29 To authenticate the videotape,
the court held that it was only necessary to establish, through expert
testimony, these three things: that the videotape had not been altered,
the date and place the videotape was taken, and the "identity of the
relevant participants depicted."2 Writing for four dissenting judges,
Judge Banke criticized the majority for abandoning a "well-settled rule
of evidence, apparently in reaction to the pathetic event of the arresting
officer's subsequent death in the line of duty."29
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In Freeman v. State,'" another decision discussed in last year's
survey,297 the court of appeals, relying on Berky and the silent witness
theory, held that a trial court properly admitted a television news
videotape of a drug transaction in which defendant was allegedly
Judge Smith concurred specially and criticized the
involved.298
majority for its "tacit expansion" of the silent witness rule.2 Judge
Smith argued that Berky should be limited to cases of necessity, and it
"Any expanwas not necessary to apply Berky to the present case.'
sion of the rule in Berky should be both explicit and required by the facts
of the case presented."0 1
The supreme court granted certiorari in Berky and, during the current
survey period, vacated the court of appeals decision on the grounds that
the court of appeals did not properly have jurisdiction of the State's
interlocutory appeal. 0 2 Thus, although the court vacated the court of
appeals decision in Berky, it did so on grounds unrelated to the
evidentiary issue of whether the videotape had been properly authenticated. 0 3
The General Assembly has now addressed this issue, perhaps
definitively. The General Assembly enacted O.C.G.A. section 24-4-48
which allows the admission of photographs, motion pictures, videotapes,
and audio recordings when the authenticating witness is unavailable.
The statute provides that, subject to any other valid objection, photographs and other recordings are admissible in the absence of an
authenticating witness if the trial court determines "that such items
tend to show reliably the fact or facts for which the items are offered."30 4 The statute also addresses photographs and recordings made
automatically, as when the device taking the photograph or making the
recording is not being operated by a person. Such photographs and
recordings are also admissible if the trial court determines that they
tend to show reliably the fact or facts for which the items are offered.308 However, the propounder of such a photograph or recording
must also establish that the recording or photograph contains the date
and time that it was made and that such date and time was made
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contemporaneously with the events depicted in the photograph or
recording. 3 6 Finally, the statute does not provide the exclusive
method of introducing into evidence photographs and recordings.
IX. MISCELLANEOUS
The court of appeals decision in Chapman v. Auto Owners Insurance
Co. 30 does not concern substantive evidence principles, but is nevertheless noteworthy. In Chapman, plaintiff Auto Owners brought a
subrogation action against defendant to recover damages for a covered
fire loss. Ten days after filing suit, Auto Owners' experts destroyed
evidence critical to the determination of the cause of the fire. Defendant
moved to either dismiss the complaint or to preclude Auto Owners'
experts from testifying about the destroyed evidence. However, the trial
court concluded that such a drastic remedy was not authorized by
Georgia law. Rather, the only remedy authorized by law was to charge
jurors that they could conclude that Auto Owners' failure to produce the
evidence raised a presumption that the evidence, if available, would have
been harmful to Auto Owners.0 ' The court of appeals, acknowledging
that this was an issue of first impression, held that if a party destroys
material evidence, a trial judge is authorized to either dismiss the case
or to prevent that party's expert witnesses from testifying about the
evidence. s°
Holmes v. State10 is a good demonstration of how an effective crossexamination can backfire. In Holmes, defendant was accused of murder
in connection with a drug transaction. A key issue at trial was whether
the murder occurred in a motel room or outside the motel room. On
cross-examination, defendant attacked a detective for the detective's
failure to lift fingerprints or take blood samples from inside the motel
room. Upon redirect, the officer testified that defendant's girlfriend told
him that the altercation between defendant and the victims took place
outside the motel room."' The court held that this testimony was
admissible to explain conduct, such as why the detective 12did not take
fingerprints or blood samples from inside the motel room.
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Holmes v. Bogino"13 provides a good practice pointer for preparing
witnesses. In Bogino, a landlord sought to recover interest on past due
rent. The trial court accepted the tenant's argument that testimony by
a witness on behalf of the landlord concerning the applicable interest
rate was hearsay. However, the witness's testimony did not affirmatively demonstrate that he was basing his testimony on hearsay."4
Presumably, the witness simply testified what the interest rate was
rather than testifying, for example, that the interest rate was based on
materials he had reviewed. Accordingly, the court of appeals held that
testimony was not objectionable pursuant to "the rule that where a
witness testifies to a fact, the presumption is that he is testifying from
his own knowledge in the absence of anything to the contrary."'
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